Despite Partial Power, Islamist Succeed in Laying Grounds for an Islamic Order

Prof. Khurshid Ahmad first came in limelight as a student editor of Islami Jamiat-e-Talbah’s official organ, Students Voice. From a member of Jamiat to a seat on the august majlis-e-shura of Jama’at-e-Islami, Pakistan, and now as Jama’at’s minister in the federal government of his country, is a long journey; but whether as a student or an Islamic worker, his abiding trait has been his commitment and hard work that he always brought to his work. Br. Khurshid visited the MSA’s headquarters on January 12, 1978, and apart from the others he talked to Islamic Horizons.

1. The Zia Administration, despite its Islamic mantle, has adopted a very cautious approach, bordering on timidity, toward the welter of problems facing Pakistani society. Under normal circumstances, such an approach might have some merits. But with the kind of situation in which Pakistan is currently caught and the opportunity that it has offered to the Islamists to show their mettle and vindicate their existence as a viable leadership, would it not be advisable to proceed with a lightning speed and dismantle the old order once and for all for a new order to rise? You may not be in power tomorrow. It is also possible that, seeing no tangible change in the nation’s affairs, armed forces withdraw their support to Zia, or there is a coup d’état.

I think this question is based upon an assumption that deserves to be clarified at the very outset. The present government and the present arrangement are not of a permanent nature; it’s supposed to be transitory. The Jama’at doesn’t hold power as such. The Jama’at and other Islamists are sharing power with the armed forces and the bureaucracy. The present arrangement is the result of peculiar conditions, which are not normal, as you have rightly said.

The fact is that the armed forces came into power to fight a certain situation bordering on a civil war. If you look into history, you will find that it’s easier for the army to come, but difficult to go. The army was forced into the political scene when the negotiations between Mr. Bhutto and the Pakistan National Alliance collapsed owing to the former’s littleness of soul. This was a unique situation and it made the armed forces’ role not only important, but unavoidable.

Now in such kind of a situation, we were faced with three major problems:

First relates to the fate of Mr. Bhutto;

Second relates to the holding of elections so that the power could be transferred to the people and at the same time provide mandate to the elected leadership for their rule;

Third relates to the number of administrative, political and economic problems inherited by post-Bhutto Pakistan.

The Islamists realized that in such a situation, if they didn’t share power even at the cost of political unpopularity, the country would be forced into what you are referring to either an internal major disruption or another military coup. The present arrangement is thus transitory, entered into with a definite view to change to a position of quasi-normalcy so that proper accountability of Mr. Bhutto and his colleagues is ensured; the electoral process is revived and made effective; the pressing economic problems are eased to an extent that the nation could realize the existence of an alternative leadership capable of delivering the good.

I think if this matrix is kept in view, then the idea of a lightening leadership or some revolutionary changes in a short span of time would appear as not well-founded. We have to face a certain situation and must not make the mistake of assuming that in the political situation of today’s Pakistan, the Islamists hold power the way the Communists held it in the October Revolution of 1917, or that an ideological group has come into power with the full support of all the sources of power. I think we should be realistic that isn’t the matrix and as such, our expectations should be in line with the situation. The challenge that the Islamists faced came from two major sources:

One, if the Islamists didn’t join the government, the benefit would go to the leftists and the secularists. We, thus, did modify our strategy. Formerly, we were for total control of power; but we thought it over if we wait for that moment then it may not happen or the possibility of such a total change may well reduce. This is in no way a departure from our objectives or our basic values. We found that sharing power would be a stepping stone to the type of capability we want to build. And again, this isn’t a change which has taken place at this particular moment in time.

In fact, the moment we started this technique of united fronts to overthrow Mr. Bhutto’s tyrannical regime, we realized there would be a transitional phase, and in that transitional phase, we wouldn’t adopt the policy of isolated independence, but will forge ahead with different groups unless we are able to influence the citadel of power from within. Now, if this is kept in view, one can very well understand our method and achievement. By joining the Zia government, we succeeded in averting the crisis that began to brew in February 1978.

You may call it holding off operation; you can call it an effort to pave the way for the type of political stance we want to take in the future. Some people may see parallels between our approach and the efforts of some of the Social Democratic movements of Europe. But for good or for bad, the Islamic movement’s assessment of the situation was that to shun the present opportunity and to wait for the moment when we will have total sway of power won’t be a sound strategy. In Turkey, the Islamists have resorted to same tactics, and we are also treading the same path.

Our second objective was not that we wanted to mobilize power for the changes we sought, but to reach for partial power and to see that by using it, we are able to present a better model of political and ideological leadership.

If you analyze the working of Jama’at and the kind of support it engenders for itself, you will find that the people who supported Jama’at’s causes – I mean not its direct supporters, but general public who would trust it for its workers’ honesty in respect of its social welfare programs; for example, some of the high government dignitaries, who otherwise would oppose Jama’at tooth and nail willingly gave the hides of sacrificial animals to it, on Eid-ul-Adha. When asked, “How come?” they said, “We have differences with them; we don’t think they can provide political leadership, but they are honest people whom we can trust for social services.”

Now, these aren’t solitary cases; digging deep down in their psyche is the apprehension that despite their religiosity and goodness, Islamists aren’t capable enough to wield power and use it in the best tradition of the statecraft. Similar apprehensions are being expressed about the Islamists in other Muslim countries. Right now, and beyond any iota of doubt, there’s a popular support for the Islamic movement in Iran, but few would say they will be able to provide a viable leadership. So, at a psychological level, this is a barrier.

We want to break this barrier by demonstrating the kind of political and economic leadership that we can provide to the country. In other words, it would be a part of the process through which we would be able to win over the people to our kind of program, to our kind of leadership, and to our kind of movement. So, if I put it bluntly first, the Jama’at wanted to protect Pakistan; second, to see that the secular­ists and the leftists are contained and the Islamists have an edge over them to keep the momentum of 1977 movement; third, to seize the moment as it represented one more plank in our fight to bring about Islamic change.

So far, we have been working in the streets, in bazaars, and in educational institutions. Now we are doing it in the governmental offices. This is an extension of our da’wah. It’s in this context that we are trying to face the problem. Your question, as I said in the beginning, has been framed on a different set of expectations, and a different set of assumptions about the political situation of the country, about the reasons the Islamists participated in power, with the result that we are not of the same wavelength. That’s why I thought it necessary to spell out, in a forthright way, the rationale for our joining the government, the real state of affairs prevailing, and the kind of expectations we should have, it’s this framework that we should take into cognizance, and not any stylized visionary situation.

1. I can appreciate the limit of power in your case, because my vantage isn’t different from yours; but when we talk from the public point of view, do you think it would be possible to convince them that within the limited share of power that you have, it wouldn’t be possible to come up to their expectations. Would it be that easy? Would they listen?

This is what we are trying. I don’t say that some of the expectations that simmer between the lines of your question are not entertained by the people in Pakistan. But then it is the task of the political leadership to show to them the genuine expectations that they should have. Our public relations campaign is primarily meant to tell the people that neither we are without power, nor do we have the full power. And as such, we should be realistic.

There are certain areas where exaggerated expectations still exist. Nevertheless, there are other areas where people are becoming clearer. Amongst such areas is our seriousness to face the issue of accountability and the influence we have tried to cast upon the administration to bring things to a final conclusion. We hope that by the end of the current month, we will be able to settle this part of the issue. At the same time, the Islamists’ integrity, their honesty and the way they are grappling with the problems in their areas of responsibility have begun to pay off. This is indeed a very different government that Pakistan ever had.

In certain areas, I think the record is one which is important. For example, in the economics field, the situation, as we inherited, was awful bad: inflation was rampant, up to 22-23 percent a year; deficit financing amounted to about $500 million a year; wheat crop totally failed it was about 25 percent less than we needed. Now in a situation like this we have succeeded at least to contain it. This year, we are expecting 9 percent inflation; the supply line of essential commodities has been restored. Wheat alone of 2.5 million tons has been imported and despite the transport system not geared to face a challenge of such magnitude, by the grace of Allah, we have been able to see that food supplies are provided even to the remotest parts of the country.

In the industrial sector, some uncertainty still looms, but textiles have shown improvement and so has machine-making and art silk industries. Exports have also shown an upward trend. So, in the toughest sector, we have been able to demonstrate our capability.

Then, at the conceptual level, I think the difference between this administration and the others is its emphasis on justice. Unfortunately, the Western press has played up the question of had dud to such an extent as if this is the only thing we have done. Subsequent to our joining the government, we made it clear that our objective is total transformation in Islam’s valuational framework and not a piece-meal change. We also stressed that the central core of Islamic scheme of reform is justice in social, economic, legal and political relations.

That’s why one of the clear statements about the objective of planning ever made in Pakistan’s history has come from this administration. We stated that we do want expansion in growth rate, but it has to go with social justice and with equitable distribution of economic gains to all strata of society; and if it means slower growth rate, we will prefer it to an artificial growth without social dimension.

Even in the introduction of Islamic laws, we have given priority to education and the identification of ideological objectives for individuals and society. The education policy, though ignored by the Western press, is one of the major contributions of the present government, wherein for the first time we have made a clear-cut statement that the objective of education is to produce good Muslims, equipped with knowledge on the one hand, and Islamic idealism and character on the other hand, where in a recognition has been made that Islamic education is not the addition of a subject on Islam to the syllabus in vogue, but to rewrite the syllabus in the light of Islam’s valuational framework.

We are doing away with co-education and within the next academic year, two separate universities for women will come into being. A high powered text committee headed by an eminent Islamic scholar has reviewed the existing syllabus and has made radical changes in it. The new books are being written to replace the existing textbooks within the next two years. Besides, we have not been oblivious to the need for teachers’ training. Their criterion for hiring has been changed with equal emphasis on technical competence and moral integrity.

1. The new Islamic measures announced by the government on Muharram 1, much that they bolster the spirits, have also caused concern in many a mind. It appears as if, instead of going to the heart of the problem, the Islamists in Pakistan are running on the periphery. Pakistan’s problems stem from injustices done to the people. Whether it is sharing power with the federating units or trampling of civil liberties, or the in application of rule of law, or economic opportunities, or promotions in the offices, it boils down to the issue of justice. But instead of emphasizing and giving justice to the society, people have been asked to perform prayers. What was the Jamaat’s stand on these measures, including haddud? Don’t you think it would have been better to establish justice first? What if, for lack of an efficient administration, it boomeranged?

The Islamists are working on institutionalizing zakah and ushr, which will be a major step toward establishing social and economic justice. We have emphasized it more than haddud. Certainly, haddud are prescribed in the Qur’an, and we are bound to stand by it; we will enforce them. An Islamic concept of haddud isn’t just punishment; in fact, law is an instrument to establish justice. If Islam punishes theft, adultery and robbery, it isn’t that we want to mete out some savage treatment to certain people but because we want to make society abide by the values of justice and rule of law. So, it’s an instrument of social justice. The Western press has tried, however, to isolate them and suggest as if that was our concept of justice. But this is not so; haddud are though a part of it.

Besides, such a view fails to see the new approach we are adopting: that while state policy, its institutions and its laws have to become the instrument of change, the state alone, through its coercive apparatus, cannot bring about the change, its essential character notwithstanding.

We never said that law alone can guarantee change. Here you have failed to grasp the Jama’at’s approach.

Jama’at-e-Islami Stands for Total Change – II

Sixty Minutes with Prof. Khurshid Ahmad

Jama’at stands for a total change. A change of such a magnitude has four major elements: First, iman, which provides motiva­tion to an individual in all spheres of life. Whether one is leading prayers, teaching in a school, heading the judiciary or presiding over the political destiny of a nation, the motiva­tion is extremely important; it’s not the social framework only. Islam emphasizes it, and it would be unjust to assume that in Jama’at’s view government alone can deliver the good; second, character as a reflection of iman or individual motivation isn’t something to be confined to psychological and emotional framework of the person, but his total personality; third, social institutions such as mosques, schools, movement and tareeqa, etc.; fourth, state and law and the institutions under it, whether relating to communication media or other institutions.

So, these are the four-element approach that Jama’at has emphasized, and in the new program given, the prayers, social justice, and law constitute the three planks of the same scheme. Now this emphasis on prayers is an integral element of the Qur’anic strategy. The Qur’an calls for a change not merely at the level of an isolated individual, but at the level of soci­ety and state, too.

The Qur’an clearly states that when they are given power over land, they establish prayers, establish zakah, order what is right, and forbid what is wrong. In exactly the same way, we are proceeding toward Islamizing Pakistan. I think it is missing the point to assume that the approach, we are giving is somewhat distorted. Let me reiterate that the central core of our program is justice, and nothing else. I don’t have any reason to suspect that this in any way will boomerang. I am sure this approach is going to succeed and will establish our credentials in the years ahead.

1. How would you evaluate Jama’at’s performance in the federal government? To what extent will it help the Islamic movement at the polls and in the years ahead’?

It is for history to judge; I can say only this much that we are doing our best. I have every reason to believe that we will gain new grounds and not lose any, Insha’Allah.

1. What justifies the ideological struggle of a group of people is their belief that human beings are essentially good, and they want change. Jama’at’s whole struggle of the past 30 years was on the premise that it was the government in power which didn’t want Islam, though people clamored for it. But ever since Jama’at has joined the federal government, it seems as if the taste of power has brought a change of heart. Statements could be cited where it has been said that the society is corrupt, that Islam can only be introduced if people act upon it. Don’t you think it is a departure from Jama’at’s erstwhile stand? There is a touch of naivety in such utterances. If Lenin had such kind of an approach, perhaps the Communist revolution in 1917 wouldn’t have taken place.

Here again you are not fair to Jama’at. We have never said, not even once, that the only thorn missing is the institution of government, Jama’at, as I tried to explain in my response to your earlier questions, has always maintained that the change has to be at all the four levels. No doubt we have said it often that without the institution of state, the kind of change we seek will not be possible to achieve. But why?

We think that today’s state is so pervasive in its influence on all departments of life that without wielding this omnipotent apparatus, no program of life would succeed. I give you an example. Maulana Mawdudi has said it on many occasions that if we are telling people, day and night, what is good and what is bad, and if the agencies of mass communication radio and TV are pouring in their ear’s values at variance with our stance, then, contrary to our protracted efforts, in a much shorter time, it will wash away everything done by us.

At the same time, if the state-media begins to convey the same values that we uphold, it wouldn’t mean that people are going to change in a day or two it only means that the forces, driving people in a direction opposite to Islamic ideals, will be contained; and instead, we will start mobilizing them toward our objectives. But it will take time. So, this isn’t correct, and it’s also incorrect to say that the Jama’at now wants people to change on their own. What we are saying today, we said it in the past, too, that each one of us has to change, including our institutions, and that such a change should be in the direction of Islam.

1. Lately, Jama’at has lowered its standards for membership. Whatever reasons Jama’at’s current leadership might have for such a move, to us sitting over here away from the scene, it is a symptom of change in the offing. Maybe Jama’at is reacting to the pressure from certain sections. Don’t you think lowering of standards will pave the way for large-scale infiltration by the anti-Islamic forces and cause disenchantment for the youth and general public? For many, it might be the end of a dream.

No, we haven’t compromised the criterion for Jama’at’s membership. Right now, we have two-tier membership: members and associate members. Both of them have certain standards, and we see to it that they are met. What we have done is, and perhaps that has caused some misgivings, that first to broaden the membership base of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), we have declared that all members of the Alliance’s several parties would be ipso facto its members, too. Second, for those who may not like to join any of the parties, they can now become PNA’s members, subject to the condition that they wouldn’t contest election for the PNA’s offices unless they come through the regular parties. This is a kind of via media to the idea that PNA should have its own direct membership, and Jama’at is supporting it.

1. Why is it so that the political causes always succeed in getting the best response from the Jama’at’s workers? Give them a political cause, and they will work like bees in large numbers. But the moment the cause is realized, or with the lapse of time the political situation abates, the workers Jose contact with the masses. The whole activity is then confined to the statements of the leaders issued to the press and the workers musing over them. Why were they not put to non-political causes in the past? Why do political issues motivate them? Is it because of. Jama’at’s orientation to politics, or has something gone wrong somewhere?

This question is, perhaps, based on lack of information. Jama’at’s members are engaged in educational, social, and other projects. In Karachi alone, about 1 million people are provided medical treatment.

But Karachi isn’t the whole of Pakistan!

Karachi is certainly better off; but there are other places, too. I can’t give you offhand information; nevertheless, 50-60 medical units are operating in other parts of Pakistan. I would say they aren’t enough, but the truth remains that in humanitarian causes, Jama’at never lagged behind. Then, in the recent movement for the reformation of society, Jama’at was in the vanguard and reached all strata of society to make the individual conscious of his or her role as a moral being.

It wasn’t done before, though?

No, it was done earlier, too. Back in 1957, we launched the movement for the safeguarding of public morals, and it was very successful in educating people about the ill effects of obscene photographs and their public display.

SALUTATION’S TO PROPHET

Every month, the MSA’s Department of Education and Training receives a number of queries on different issues. Islamic Horizons, from now onward for the benefit of our readers, will publish all such queries and the department’s response thereto.

Q: I understand MSA is very well organized and is one of the major organizations in North America. I am thus directing this question to you.

For past years, our Jama’at has been celebrating Prophet Muhammad’s birthday with the recital of “salaam.” This year during Milad-un-Nabi, “salaam” was not recited, because according to some members it is bid’ah (innovation). To avoid disunity and friction in the community, recital of salaam was eliminated from the program; however, the majority of members wanted it. Please tell me in the light of Qur’an and Hadith whether it is permissible to stand up salaam, to say salaam, and to celebrate Prophet’s birthday or not.

I am enclosing a copy of Salaam, plus the fatwas from various Muftis, ‘Ulamas and Maulanas to check the authenticity of the fatwas.

Mohammed Azam Khan

Daly City, CA

1. Islamic position is very simple. The Qur’an says explicitly that believers must address their   salaam, with all respect, to the Prophet (pbuh).

God and His Angels send blessings on the Prophet: O you that believe! Send your blessings on him, and salute him with all respect.

Surah Al-Ahzab (33): 56

The above ayah establishes the validity of salutation; but how to do it was told to us the Prophet (PBUH) himself:

Narrated ‘Abdur-Rahman bin Abi Laila: Ka’b bin ‘ Ujra met and said, “Shall I give you a present? Once the Prophet came to us and we said ‘O Allah’s Apostle! We know how to greet you, but how to send Salat upon you?’ He said, ‘Say: Allahummain salli aIa Muhammadin wa’ala ali Muhammadin, kama sal-laita ala ali Ibrahima Innaka hamidun majid, Allahumma barik ala Muhammadin wa’ala ali Muhammadin, kama barakta ala ali Ibrahima, innaka hamidun majid.’ ”

Vol. 8, Bukhari, p. 245

This salaam is a part of our daily prayer and we recite it after tashahud. Not a single hadith refers to the kind of salaam you have mentioned.

It is reported that the Prophet (PBUH) did not allow any of his companions to show their respect for him by standing up. Whenever he walked into a group of companions, he wanted them to stay seated.

As such, it does not make sense to think that whenever a Muslim would send salaam (salutation), he or she would stand. Consequently, it is correct to say that the traditional practice as it exists in some communities is an innovation and has nothing to do with the Sunnah. Seizing salaam to the Prophet (PBUH), as much as possible, the way the Qur’an laid it is, however a means to seeking Allah’s pleasure; and a Muslim must do so.

Narrates Abdallah ‘Amr: If anyone invokes blessing on the Prophet once, God and His Angels will grant him seventy blessings.                             

Narrates ‘Umar al-Khattab: The supplication is stopped between heaven and earth, none of it ascending until you invoke blessing on your Prophet.                

 

Q: The institution of Zakah fund is indeed good news. Would it be possible to divert some of these funds toward the construction of homes for the aged?

A: May Allah bless you for bringing to our notice an extremely important issue ‘which most Americans are facing. Your suggestion is extremely valid that some zakah money might be used to construct home and facilities for aged people. But, in Islam question of separate homes for senior citizens docs not arise at all, because Islam does not approve of excluding grandmother, grandfather, or even a granduncle who do not have children from being part Me family. As such, one who is aged cannot be left alone.

This is a religious commandment, not a favor, for every member of the family (whether married or unmarried) to take care of those who need assistance in the family. Therefore, if Islamic teachings are propagated and non-Muslim Americans are introduced to this Islamic family structure, they can eliminate these institutions for aged people.

In Islam, age calls for respect and not for alienation. The more aged a person is the more respectable and loving he become-. In other words, if Islamic family structure is established, many suicides, mental disorders, psychological cases, etc. would be corrected. As we know, many of these aged people living in senior citizen homes die to hear a single word of love from anyone around them. The Islamic family structure solves this problem. I hope I have answered your question; still, your concern is extremely valuable for us. May Allah bless you.

1. Would you compare social or political response by Jama’at to the missionary zeal of Tableegi Jama’at?

Even otherwise, the missionary zeal is very much there. For example, thousands of our workers. are in contact with the people: setting up the Qur’anic study circles, distributing literature, and conducting Jumu’ah khutbah. This, I think, is a better parallel between the Jama’at and Tableegi people. I can give you an idea; every week we conduct, at 10-15,000 places all over the country, the Qur’anic lesson to make people understand its message. These are all continuous, lasting activities, done without any fanfare.

1. Your personality has lately been made controversial. You are dubbed as a reformist who has lost his revolutionary zeal. Would it be correct to say so? Is there any difference between a reformist and a revolutionary approach?

I don’t know whether I was a revolutionary, and later became a reformist, or was a reformist and then became a revolutionary. It is for others to judge. But I can say one thing for sure that after 30 years in Islamic movement, I find the same commitment and the same motivation. I have tried to uphold the cause to the best of my abilities, and all praise to Allah (subhanahu wata’ala) with taufiq from Him, I haven’t compromised any principles.

My exposure to movements in different parts of the world, has helped me in understanding social change and its dynamics, but my inspiration comes from the Qur’an and Sunnah, and the approach therein. I regard the Qur’anic approach different from the approach given by the thrust of Western movements over the past 200 years. The West’s approach is that man can be changed by the change of institution, while the Qur’anic strategy is to change man from within and without. You can’t change a person from within unless Iman is there. Even when so-called good deeds are there by so-called good deeds, I mean the apparent pious posture because in the Qur’anic context, motivation is a must, without which no deed could be good. But then, Iman alone isn’t enough; it has to be coupled with institutional change at the societal level, as well as state level. This, in short, is the Qur’anic strategy for change, and I stand by it in total.

Many movements are called reformist or partial approaches, be it Buddhism, Christianity or Judaism, or Capitalism, Socialism or Communism; none of these deal with man in his Totality, but Islam does, and this is what I mean by social change. Revolution is not wearing a particular kind of facial expression or obsession with certain tactics.

Now there’s no contradiction between this revolutionary change and a gradual process. I sincerely believe that there’s a failure to understand the ethos of a social change when some people assume that a change can take place by one large leap condensed into a very short span of time. This, to me, isn’t a correct appreciation of the whole phenomenon. Islamic approach is that the change begins when an individual commits oneself to God, and the process continues until one breathes one’s last. That’s why the Qur’anic emphasis on.

So, it’s a lifelong process; and during this process, things have to move, to change, and to modify; the final outcome will be radically different from the starting point. But then, everything can’t take place in the twinkle of an eye. Look to the Prophet’s life, which is our model there were a lot many things that took 23½ years to reach fruition. Whenever an Islamic effort is made, this graduation will unfold itself.

Now these are the elements of strategy that I understand from the Qur’an and Sunnah. If this is reformism, I am proud of it; it’s revolutionary, I am proud of it. This is something which has been a constant element in my life; short of that, I have no claim to infallibility. I am a human, a very frail being, and I have always sought God’s help and forgiveness for my failings. Whether somebody accepts me or rejects me, I don’t care. For me, it suffices if I breathe my last in the movement.

As being controversial, 1 don’t think it’s necessarily bad. I have yet to find a person espousing a cause that is not controversial.

Compared with any other system be it religion or any social ideology of our time this approach of Islam is revolutionary. After all, what’s a revolution? To me, revolution means total change. The excellent balance and moderation that characterize the Islamic system of government and precise distinctions made in it between right and wrong elicit from all men of honesty and intelligence the admiration and the admission that such a balanced system could not have been framed by anyone but the Omniscient and All-Wise God.

Islamic State is an Ideological State

Another characteristic of the Islamic state is that it is an ideological state, it is clear from a careful consideration of the Qur’an and the Sunnah that the state in Islam is based on an ideology and its objective is to establish that ideology. State is an instrument of reform and must act likewise. It is a dictate of this very nature of the Islamic state that such a state should be run only by those who believe in the ideology on which it is based and in the Divine Law which it is assigned to administer. The administrators of the Islamic state must be those whose whole life is devoted to the observance and enforcement of this Law, who not only agree with its reformatory program and fully believe in it, but thoroughly comprehend its spirit and are acquainted with its details. Islam does not recognize any geographical, linguistic or color bars in this respect. It puts forward its code of guidance and the scheme of its reform before all men. Whoever accepts this program, no matter to what race, nation or country he may belong to, can join the community that runs the Islamic state. But those who do not accept it are not entitled to have any hand in shaping the fundamental policy of the slate. They can live within the confines of the state as non-Muslim citizens (dhimmis). Specific rights and privileges have been accorded to them in the Islamic Law. A dhimmi’s life, property and honor will be fully protected and if he is capable of any service, his services will also be made use of. He will not, however, be allowed to influence the basic policy of this ideological state.

Islamic Khilafah vs. Kingship

It has already been stated that in Islam, Allah alone is the real sovereign. Keeping this cardinal principle in mind, if we consider the position of those persons who set out to enforce God’s law on earth, it is but natural to say that they should be regarded as representatives of the Supreme Ruler. Islam has assigned precisely that very position to them. Accordingly, the Holy Qur’an says:

“Allah has promised to those among you who believe and do righteous deeds that He will assuredly make them to succeed (the present rulers) and grant them vicegerency in the land just as He made those before them to succeed (others).” (24:55)

The verse illustrates the Islamic theory of the state very clearly. Two fundamental points emerge from it:

1. The first point is that Islam uses the term “vicegerency” (khilafah) instead of sovereignty. Since, according to Islam, sovereignty belongs to Allah alone, anyone who holds power and rules in accordance with the laws of God will undoubtedly be the vicegerent of the Supreme Ruler and will not be authorized to exercise any powers other than those delegated to him.
2. The second point stated in the verse that the power to rule over the earth has been promised to the whole community of believers; it has not been stated any particular person or class among them will be raised to that position. From this, it follows that all believers are repositories of the caliphate. The caliphate granted by God to the faithful is the popular vicegerency and not a limited one. There is no reservation in favor of any family, class or race. Every believer is a caliph of Allah in his individual capacity. By virtue of this position, he is individually responsible to God. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) has said: “Every one of you is a ruler and everyone is answerable for his subjects.” Thus, one caliph is in no way inferior to another.

This is the real foundation of democracy in Islam. The following points emerge from an analysis of this conception of popular vicegerency:

1. Classless Society

A society in which everyone is a caliph to God and an equal participant in the caliphate cannot tolerate any class divisions based on distinctions of birth and social positions. All men enjoy equal status and position in such a society. The only criterion of superiority in this social order is personal ability and character. This is what has been repeatedly and explicitly asserted by the Holy Prophet:

“No one is superior to another except in point of faith and piety. All men are descended from Adam and Adam was made of clay.”

“An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab; neither does a white man possess any superiority over a black man, nor a black man over a white one, except in point of piety.”

After the conquest of Makkah, when the whole of Arabia came under the domination of the Islamic State, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) addressing the members of his own clan, who in the days before Islam enjoyed the same status in Arabia as the Brahmins did in ancient India, said:

O people of Qurayish! Allah has rooted out your haughtiness the days of Ignorance and the pride of ancestry. O men, all of you are descended from Adam and Adam was made of clay. There is no pride whatever in ancestry: there is no in an Arab against a non-Arab, nor in a non-Arab as against an Arab. Verily the most meritorious among you in the eyes of God is he who is the most pious.

1. Equal Opportunity

In such a society, no individual or group of individuals will suffer any disability on account of birth, social status or profession that may in any way impede the growth of his faculties or hamper the development of his personality. Everyone would enjoy equal opportunities of progress. The way would be left open for him to make as much progress as possible according to his inborn capacity and personal merits, without prejudice to similar rights of other people. Thus, unrestricted scope for personal achievement has always been the hallmark of Islamic society. Slaves and their descendants were appointed as military officers and governors of provinces, and noblemen belonging to the highest families did not feel ashamed to serve under them. Cobblers who used to stitch and mend shoes rose in the social scale and became leaders of highest order (imams); weavers and cloth sellers became judges, muftis and jurists and to this day, they are reckoned as the heroes of Islam. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) has said:

“Listen and obey even if a negro (slave) is appointed as a ruler over you.”

1. No Dictatorship

There is no room in such a society for the dictatorship of any person or group of persons since everyone is a caliph of Allah herein. No person or group of persons is entitled to become an absolute ruler by depriving the rank and file of their inherent right of caliphate.

The position of a man who is selected to conduct the affairs of the state is no more than this: that all Muslims (or, technically speaking, all caliphs of God) delegate their caliphate to him for administrative purposes. He is answerable to Allah on one hand and on the other to his fellow ‘caliphs’ who have delegated their authority to him. Now, if he raises himself to the position of an irresponsible, absolute ruler, that is to say, a dictator, he assumes the character of a usurper rather than a caliph, because dictatorship is the negation of popular vicegerency.

No doubt, the Islamic State is an all-embracing state and comprises within its sphere all departments of life; but this all-inclusiveness and universality are based upon the universality of Divine Law, which an Islamic ruler has to observe and enforce. The guidance given by Allah about every aspect of life will certainly be enforced in its entirety. But an Islamic ruler cannot depart from these instructions and adopt a policy of regimentation of his own. He cannot force people to follow or not to follow a particular profession; to learn or not to learn a special art; to use or not to use a certain dress and to educate or not to educate their children in a certain manner.

The powers which dictators of Russia, Germany and Italy have appropriated or Ataturk has exercised in Turkey, have not been granted by Islam to its Amir leader. Besides this, another important point is that in Islam every individual is personally answerable to God. This personal responsibility cannot be shared by anyone else. Hence, an individual enjoys full liberty to choose whichever path he likes and to develop his faculties in any direction that suits his natural gifts. If the leader obstructs the growth of this personality, he will himself be punished by Allah for this tyranny. That is precisely the reason why there is not the slightest trace of regimentation in the rule of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and of his right-guided Caliphs.

1. Liberty and Freedom of Opinion

In such a society, every sane and adult Muslim, male or female, is entitled to express his or her opinion, for each one of them is the repository of the caliphate. Allah has made this caliphate conditional, not upon any particular standard of wealth or competence, but only upon faith and good conduct. Therefore, all Muslims have equal freedom to express their opinions.

Islam was perceived as a retrogressive religion opposed to progress and technology, and Khomeini in his call to the purity of Islam, became the butt of then insensitive writings. Chador, or the outer garment of a traditional Muslim woman, aroused strange imagery “When the wind whips down the narrow streets and alleys, catching the black cloth of the chadors, the women resemble giant crows.”

The crisis in Iran conveyed to the media a chilling message that a new dark force was at work in the world. The modernity and the setback that it will receive in an Islamic milieu were a recurrent theme. Islamic revival, to many, was stirring a fundamentalist reaction which I materialized, would create new stresses and strains on the social, racial and religious is equilibrium. Delineated as an essential escape from modernity, Islam’s ability to ameliorate the lot of masses was tauntingly questioned. Commenting on the introduction of Islamic measures in Pakistan, Newsweek wrote, “The immediate question for Islam is whether the system of Allah and His prophet can produce goods and services as well as morality. The larger issue is to what degree. Muslims can meet the challenge of a technological world that the Prophet never envisioned.”

Many a time, the press wrote what they wanted to believe. The past history of European experience with religion and the old animosity resulting from the Crusaders’ era obscured the U.S. ability to follow the dynamics of Islamic revival in Iran. From one hypothesis to another hypothesis, moved. Until the last week of January, the press was fanning hopes that the mover would fall apart, that Khomeini was not as popular as it appeared to be. Some, in their eagerness to see an end to Islamic movement, spoke out their minds in a way that sent chills down the readers’ spines:

It is possible that, in the explosive climate to which he would return, he could be killed.

Khomeini was dubbed as a clerical fascist bent upon thwarting Iranians’ march toward a modern society. Khomeini was the shadow, a representative of dark forces whose emergence into power would engulf Iran into darkness. In one of the cartoons, “he was shown as a shadow in his traditional robe with a staff in his hand, stalking the ground signifying Iran’s bleak future.” In another cartoon, he was shown riding a donkey as a man in search of the future, but heading to the year 630.

Slurs, innuendoes, butts abound; that Islam was opposed to the use of technology was never discussed academically.